The Antalya Impasse: What COP31 Really Means for Somalia

A concise assessment of why the 31st UN Climate Change Conference collapsed into overtime, where commitments fell short across twelve negotiation tracks, and how Somalia and Africa can lead toward COP32 in Addis Ababa.

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When delegates finally walked out of the Antalya EXPO Center in Türkiye on Sunday, 22 November 2026, COP31 had become the longest United Nations climate summit on record—and the first since Copenhagen in 2009 to conclude without a consensus political cover decision **(UN News, 2026)**.

For the **Climate Resilience and Adaptation Network (CRAN)** and the communities we serve across Somalia, the collapse of the proposed "**Antalya Pact**" is far more than a diplomatic headline. In Somalia, climate breakdown is an everyday emergency: parched rangelands, flash floods along the Shabelle and Juba rivers, encroaching sand dunes, coastal erosion, and over 3.8 million internally displaced persons. While negotiators argued over bracketed text in Antalya, frontline communities were absorbing the cost of historical emissions they did not create.

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: THE SPLIT OUTCOME OF COP31

COP31 produced a sharp divide between **diplomatic deadlock at the top** and **real-economy progress on the ground**. While the overarching cover text collapsed over fossil fuel erasure and missing adaptation grants, Parties adopted a formal **Just Transition** negotiating decision and launched the **COP31 Electrification Delivery Package (UNFCCC, 2026; UN News, 2026)**.

Why COP31 Fractured in Overtime

Convened under a novel dual-presidency model pairing Türkiye's Minister Murat Kurum as COP31 President with Australia's Minister Chris Bowen as President of Negotiations **(UNFCCC, 2026)**, COP31 was expected to operationalize earlier commitments: the COP28 pledge to transition away from fossil fuels, the COP29 New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) targeting **$300 billion annually by 2035** (within a $1.3 trillion broader mobilization goal), and COP30's call to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035.

- **The Fossil Fuel Erasure:** An earlier second-week draft urged an accelerated phase-out of coal, oil, and gas. A shortened compromise text released on 19 November stripped out fossil fuels altogether to placate major exporters—including Saudi Arabia (speaking for the League of Arab States) and Russia—while inserting language on carbon capture and storage (CCS) **(Harvey, 2026)**. Backed by a coalition of roughly 130 nations, the European Union, Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, Panama, Norway, and Belize formally objected in the final plenary on 22 November, blocking consensus **(UN News, 2026)**.
- **The Adaptation & Debt Finance Gap:** Developing nations pressed for grant-based adaptation and loss and damage funding without adding unsustainable sovereign debt. Tensions escalated when Australia framed COP31 as "not a finance COP" **(Harvey, 2026)**, prompting African ministers on 20 November to respond bluntly: *"We did not come here to beg."*

Climate Finance Reality vs. Frontline Needs

Somalia's national climate planning documents an adaptation requirement of **$6.3 billion through 2035 (FTL Somalia, 2026)**. Yet when the Antalya cover pact collapsed, the proposed **"Antalya-to-Addis Ababa Roadmap on Adaptation and Resilience"** fell with it—leaving zero new public grant commitments or binding delivery plans to triple adaptation finance.



Figure 1 : Headline global climate finance targets ($1 ,300B/yr broad mobilization and $300B/yr core NCQG) and COP31 -linked private electrification financing (~€60B) contrasted against Somalia's documented $6.3B adaptation requirement through 2035 and $0 in new public adaptation grants adopted at COP31 **(FTL Somalia, 2026; UNFCCC, 2026)**.

The Gap Analysis

Across all twelve core negotiating tracks at COP31, CRAN's evaluation shows that real-economy clean electrification and technical Just Transition work advanced, whereas mitigation integrity, adaptation grants, and loss and damage replenishment suffered severe shortfalls.



Figure 2: CRAN gap analysis across all twelve COP31 negotiation categories, illustrating delivered technical or Action Agenda progress alongside remaining policy and financing deficits.

What Was Adopted vs. What Was Lost

Track / Outcome	What Was Delivered at COP31	What Remained Unresolved
Just Transition & Equity	Formal negotiating decision on a **Just Transition** adopted at closing plenary **(UN News, 2026)**.	Lacks dedicated grant-based financing to support developing economies.
Electrification & Action Agenda	*COP31 Electrification Delivery Package* and *Early Warnings for All* partnerships launched **(UNFCCC, 2026)**.	Voluntary pledges only; high borrowing costs still restrict LDC grid investments.
1.5°C Overshoot & Cover Pact	Late draft acknowledged impending 1.5°C overshoot for the first time in UN drafting **(Harvey, 2026)**.	Cover text vetoed after fossil fuels were deleted; Antalya-to-Addis Adaptation Roadmap fell.
Loss & Damage (FRLD)	Routine annual report and operational guidance adopted under CMA 8 **(UNFCCC, 2026d)**.	Zero major replenishment pledges; payouts (e.g., $21 M to Nepal) remain tiny vs. losses.

> *"There may be no consensus in the negotiating room. There is no ambiguity in the science..... We can't put out the fire while pouring fuel on it."*
>
> **— UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Closing Remarks on COP31, 22 November 2026 (UN News, 2026)**

In his closing remarks on 22 November, Secretary-General Guterres voiced deep frustration over fossil fuel obstruction while urging civil society, youth, Indigenous Peoples, and frontline communities to keep pressing for real-world action **(UN News, 2026)**. UNFCCC Executive Secretary **Simon Stiell** likewise noted in the closing plenary that the COP process has scope to *"improve, modernise, and reform"* **(UNFCCC, 2026)**.

Somalia's Leadership and the Road to COP32

Somalia did not arrive in Antalya as a passive aid recipient. It became the first East African nation to submit its updated **NDC 3.0**—pledging a **34% greenhouse gas reduction by 2035** (conditional on support) and directing **55% of strategic priorities toward adaptation (MoECC Somalia, 2025)**—and launched its national **Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) System Development Plan** at COP31 alongside Green Climate Fund private-sector dialogues **(AllAfrica, 2026)**.



Figure 3: Somalia's proactive NDC 3.0 commitments (55% adaptation priority share; 34% emissions reduction target by 2035) set against Africa's minimal contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions (<4%) and disproportionate climate vulnerability **(MoECC Somalia, 2025)**.

As global climate diplomacy now turns toward **COP32 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (8–19 November 2027)** , CRAN urges four immediate priorities: (1) a binding developed-country delivery roadmap to triple grant-based adaptation finance by 2035; (2) fast-track Direct Access accreditation for Somali institutions in the GCF, Adaptation Fund, and Loss and Damage Fund; (3) scaling decentralized solar mini-grids, coastal mangrove restoration, and customary rangeland governance; and (4) reforming UNFCCC consensus rules so petrostate vetoes cannot paralyze global survival.
(COP32 Host Committee, 2026)

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